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						RussiaReport on the recent Russian parliamentary elections | 
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			77% of Russians are dissatisfied with the results of Sunday's parliamentary
			elections. Callers to a TV show who said they thought the elections were
			honest and democratic were outnumbered 4 to 1 by those who thought the
			opposite. Despite this, the Kremlin are crowing over their apparent victory
			after the new Party "Unity" formed just 3 months ago by Premier Putin won
			23% of the vote and approximately 30% of the seats. Other parties that won
			seats (The Union of right forces with 8,7% of the vote, Jirinovskii's party
			with 6% and at least part of Moscow mayor Luzhkov's block with 12%) will
			help the government maintain a majority in the Parliament.
			
			The communist party gained the highest percentage of votes with 24% but saw
			the number of places it could count on in the duma slashed from over 200 to
			less than a 150. Although the percentage vote was up, the actual number
			who voted for them was significantly down but where the party really
			suffered was that other parties that were allied to it in the last election
			such as the agrarians did not this time participate. If in 1995 the CP and
			its allies gained nearly 35% of the votes, these parties gained a total of
			only 27% this time. The current speaker the Communist Selyeznov is likely to
			be replaced - an event he obviously expected as he ran for Governor of the
			Moscow region.
			
			In third place was Fatherland-All Russia, the party led by Moscow Mayor
			Luzhkov and former premier Primakhov. This bloc gained 12.5% and won
			overwhelming control of the Moscow City Parliament. This vote was achieved
			despite an extremely viscous campaign of vilification by the Kremlin and
			mass media. The Kremlin in particular feared that if this party came to
			power it would review the privatisation programme and start a process of
			redistribution of the privatised assets to Luzhkov loyalists. Until about 6
			months ago, it looked like this party would win over a large part of the
			state bureaucracy and regional governors, which would have guaranteed it
			victory, but these people deserted Luzhkov when Putin formed his Unity
			Party. There is now speculation that those regional leaders who stayed loyal
			to Luzhkov in the elections may well split from his Duma fraction, going
			over to Putin. This makes success for either Luzkhov or Primakov in June's
			Presidential election less likely.
			
			One of the surprises was the relative success of the Union of Right forces
			lead by former Premier Kiriyenko (who was sacked as a result of the rouble
			crisis in August 1998) and with open backing from Kremlin insider Anatolii
			Chubais. This party, with neo liberal politics used very populist slogans
			such as "We want to live in Russia, but live like Europe" and against
			conscription into the army. Having received considerable backing from the
			mass media and clearly the Kremlin, it was able to gain support from a layer
			of urban youth and intelligentsia. Support for such parties however is
			shallow. It had to pay people to work for it and comrades working on one
			polling station were able to convince some of their activists to visit our
			meetings.
			
			Jirinovskii was lucky to cross the 5% barrier. Having won 23% of the vote in
			1993 and 12% in 1995, his 6% this time shows he is clearly a spent force. He
			undermined his own election campaign by nominating leading mafia figures as
			party candidates. He argued that as the black economy is the only successful
			sector, he was proud to have its representatives in his party. With little
			support in the big cities, he attracts a layer of lumpenised supporters who
			would probably otherwise vote for the CP, so it is in the Kremlin's
			interests to keep his party alive for a while.
			
			The sudden growth of Unity demonstrates that the bourgeois have no stable
			party on which they can rely in elections. In its place they have the
			"party of power" in other words the powerful state apparatus, which defends
			its own interests in elections. These people, senior bureaucrats, regional
			governors and businessmen, not forgetting of course the armed forces,
			cynically decide who they will support and then use the state apparatus to
			mobilise the support of the population. Local authorities delegate staff to
			work in the election campaign and assign premises, private companies second
			senior management. Money is promised, wages paid, threats suggested. In
			1993, this party of power put its weight behind Gaidar's "Democratic Russia'
			. In 1995, they backed Chernomyrdin's "Our House". Six months ago they were
			edging towards Luzhkov only to swing behind Putin when the Chechen war was
			launched.
			
			But this does not explain the victory of Unity. Both in 1993 and 1995, the
			Party of Power was given a bloody nose gaining only about 10% of the vote.
			The western mass media explain this as a sign of overwhelming support for
			the war in Chechnya. That also is a very simplistic answer. The chattering
			classes in Russia clearly do support the war but comrades who were working
			in the industrial cities during the election report that people's attitude
			to the war was not jingoistic and many are against. First of all, parents of
			conscripts were very worried their sons would be sent to Chechnya and there
			was widespread hatred for Putin and Yeltsin. Secondly, the issues that
			concerned workers most in the election were very concrete questions of wages
			and the fate of their factories. Campaigners were almost never asked about
			the war. At the same time, there was no disagreement amongst the parties on
			the war. Zyuganov spoke at meetings where he would spend 15-20 minutes
			talking about his life in the caucuses - Russians are civilised but
			caucasians have a different culture, they are brought up to be bandits and
			thieves was his theme.
			
			The real reason for Putin's victory is that there was no better alternative
			on offer. The communist party waged a completely ineffectual campaign. It
			started badly by announcing it was fighting a three pronged attack by
			supporting two other parties - one to attract the left, the other to attract
			nationalists. These two parties promptly defected to Luzhkov or Putin and
			between them gained less than 0.5% of the vote. Then the CP voted to endorse
			Putin as premier, offered no opposition to the Chechen war and has been
			quite about the government's policies particularly in the economy. None of
			the other parties did any better, indeed many voters complained that all the
			politicians ever did was say how bad things were without offering any
			alternative.
			
			Although not many youth voted for the CP, many workers did. Even amongst the
			traditionally anti-communist miners of Vorkuta a significant number voted
			for them. They did so often denying any evidence that the party would betray
			their interests. In one region where comrades were working, the Regional
			Governor was third on the CP national list. This character is well known for
			sending the riot police against strikers. When comrades tried to convince a
			group of CP members that the Governor was on Zyuganov's list, they refused
			to listen, calling him a provocateur.
			
			It is clear looking at the results that a layer of people voted for unity
			for no other reason they didn't see any better alternative. Some Vorkuta
			miners did so arguing that at least there were signs of stability under
			Putin, the war was not an issue, it was too far away. After 10 years of
			chaos, people are tired and have been prepared to give Putin a chance as his
			first move in Chechnya appears at first glance to have been successful. The
			government has also had a $1billion a month windfall from oil price rises.
			In this context it would be wrong to see these results as marking a big
			swing to the right in public opinion. The temporary victory of Putin could
			well be as short lived as the popularity boosts that have pushed other
			politicians into the limelight - Nemtsov, Jirinovskii, Lebed and most
			significantly Yeltsin himself. It is not even excluded, but not very likely,
			that Yeltsin could even dump Putin - he has a habit of using such people for
			as long as they offer no threat to his position.
			
			It should also be pointed out that there was a drop in turn out by about 4%
			and the number of voters who voted "against all" increased to about 3.5%.
			Many people were not able to make up their mind until the actual day of
			voting. This reflects a growing despair by some that no party is worth
			supporting.
			
			The elections were far from democratic. OCSE observers who called them
			fundamentally fair either did not understand what was going on or where
			intentionally whitewashing over the infringements. Even in Central Moscow
			polling stations where comrades were acting as observers there were many
			undemocratic practices - such as people being told by the electoral
			commission who to vote for. In the Moscow region a row has broken out over
			the clear falsification of voting. What it must have been like in further
			flung areas can only be a matter of speculation.
			
			Our position in these elections was to explain the need for a workers' party
			but in the absence of one to give super critical support to the block formed
			by a couple of the smaller CPs and trade unions. This block gained 2.5% and
			was the party with the biggest vote that failed to clear the 5% barrier. We
			helped this block in Moscow and actively participated in the campaign of one
			of the better candidates of this block in Tula - in the region where last
			year workers took over the Yasnogorsk factory. He got 3% of the vote overall
			with 10% in Yasnogorsk. Our flyposter calling for a workers' candidate was
			actively used in his campaign.
			
			Elsewhere, in Astrakhan a victory was won by Oleg Shein and active
			independent and left trade unionist. He gained a seat in the Duma with just
			over 20% of the vote despite a very dirty campaign against him. He promises
			to use his position in the Duma to fight for workers' rights and socialism.
			Oleg participated in last May's workers conference we organised in Voronezh.
			Notwithstanding any doubts we have about Oleg's programme (he is a state
			capitalist supporter and reflects many of the sectarian attitudes of such
			people) this is still a big step forward.
			
			
			These elections have really been the first round of the Presidential
			elections due for June next year. Candidates and strategies have been
			tested. Many found wanting. But between now and June there can be many
			upsets, in the economy and particularly around Chechnya.